Chapter VIII
Strengthening of the Multilateral System
Art. 23 of the DSU deals, as indicated by its title, with the “Strengthening of the Multilateral System”. Its overall design is to prevent WTO Members from unilaterally resolving their disputes in respect of WTO rights and obligations. It does so by obligating Members to follow the multilateral rules and procedures of the DSU. Art. 23 of the DSU reads:
“Strengthening of the Multilateral System
1. When Members seek the redress of a violation of obligations or other nullification or impairment of benefits under the covered agreements or an impediment to the attainment of any objective of the covered agreements, they shall have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures of this Understanding.
2. In such cases, Members shall:
(a) not make a determination to the effect that a violation has occurred, that benefits have been nullified or impaired or that the attainment of any objective of the covered agreements has been impeded, except through recourse to dispute settlement in accordance with the rules and procedures of this Understanding, and shall make any such determination consistent with the findings contained in the panel or Appellate Body report adopted by the DSB or an arbitration award rendered under this Understanding;
(b) follow the procedures set forth in Article 21 to determine the reasonable period of time for the Member concerned to implement the recommendations and rulings; and
(c) follow the procedures set forth in Article 22 to determine the level of suspension of concessions or other obligations and obtain DSB authorization in accordance with those procedures before suspending concessions or other obligations under the covered agreements in response to the failure of the Member concerned to implement the recommendations and rulings within that reasonable period of time.”
In this section, to end this book, the author means to take a precise overlook on the nature of obligations under Art. 23 of the DSU as a whole by referring to two panels’ reports in part. In this respect, the Panel in US-Sections 301-310 (DS152) rules: 1
“On this basis [provision of Article 23], we conclude as follows:
(a)It is for the WTO through the DSU process - not for an individual WTO Member - to determine that a WTO inconsistency has occurred (Article 23.2(a)).
(b)It is for the WTO or both of the disputing parties, through the procedures set forth in Article 21 - not for an individual WTO Member - to determine the reasonable period of time for the Member concerned to implement DSB recommendations and rulings (Article 23.2(b)).
(c)It is for the WTO through the procedures set forth in Article 22 - not for an individual WTO Member - to determine, in the event of disagreement, the level of suspension of concessions or other obligations that can be imposed as a result of a WTO inconsistency, as well as to grant authorization for the actual implementation of these suspensions.
Article 23.2 clearly, thus, prohibits specific instances of unilateral conduct by WTO Members when they seek redress for WTO inconsistencies in any given dispute. This is, in our view, the first type of obligations covered under Article 23.
Article 23.1 is not concerned only with specific instances of violation. It prescribes a general duty of a dual nature. First, it imposes on all Members to ‘have recourse to’ the multilateral process set out in the DSU when they seek the redress of a WTO inconsistency. In these circumstances, Members have to have recourse to the DSU dispute settlement system to the exclusion of any other system, in particular a system of unilateral enforcement of WTO rights and obligations. This, what one could call ‘exclusive dispute resolution clause’, is an important new element of Members' rights and obligations under the DSU. Second, Article 23.1 also prescribes that Members, when they have recourse to the dispute settlement system in the DSU, have to ‘abide by’ the rules and procedures set out in the DSU. This second obligation under Article 23.1 is of a confirmatory nature: when having recourse to the DSU Members must abide by all DSU rules and procedures.
Turning to the second paragraph under Article 23, Article 23.2 - which, on its face, addresses conduct in specific disputes - starts with the words ‘[i]n such cases’. It is, thus, explicitly linked to, and has to be read together with and subject to, Article 23.1.
Indeed, two of the three prohibitions mentioned in Article 23.2 - Article 23.2(b) and (c) - are but egregious examples of conduct that contradicts the rules and procedures of the DSU which, under the obligation in Article 23.1 to ‘abide by the rules and procedures’ of the DSU, Members are obligated to follow. These rules and procedures clearly cover much more than the ones specifically mentioned in Article 23.2. There is a great deal more State conduct which can violate the general obligation in Article 23.1 to have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures of the DSU than the instances especially singled out in Article 23.2.
Article 23 interdicts, thus, more than action in specific disputes, it also provides discipline for the general process WTO Members must follow when seeking redress of WTO inconsistencies. A violation of the explicit provisions of Article 23 can, therefore, be of two different kinds. It can be caused
(a)by an ad hoc, specific action in a given dispute, or
(b)by measures of general applicability, e.g. legislation or regulations, providing for a certain process to be followed which does not, say, include recourse to the DSU dispute settlement system or abide by the rules and procedures of the DSU.”
Furthermore, as to Art. 23 of the DSU, the Panel in US-Import Measures (DS165) confirms the ruling developed in US-Sections 301-310, and states: 2
“The Panel believes that the adopted Panel Report on United States - Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974 (‘US - Section 301’) has confirmed the crucial importance that WTO Members place on the dispute settlement system of the WTO, as the exclusive means to redress any violations of any provisions of the WTO Agreement. This fundamental principle is embedded in Article 23 of the DSU: …
An important reason why Article 23 of the DSU must be interpreted with a view to prohibiting any form of unilateral action is because such unilateral actions threaten the stability and predictability of the multilateral trade system, a necessary component for "market conditions conducive to individual economic activity in national and global markets" which, in themselves, constitute a fundamental goal of the WTO. Unilateral actions are, therefore, contrary to the essence of the multilateral trade system of the WTO. As stated in the Panel Report on US - Section 301:
‘7.75 Providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading system is another central object and purpose of the system which could be instrumental to achieving the broad objectives of the Preamble. Of all WTO disciplines, the DSU is one of the most important instruments to protect the security and predictability of the multilateral trading system and through it that of the market-place and its different operators. DSU provisions must, thus, be interpreted in the light of this object and purpose and in a manner which would most effectively enhance it.’
The structure of Article 23 is that the first paragraph states the general prohibition or general obligation, i.e. when Members seek the redress of a WTO violation, they shall do so only through the DSU. This is a general obligation. Any attempt to seek ‘redress’ can take place only in the institutional framework of the WTO and pursuant to the rules and procedures of the DSU.
The prohibition against unilateral redress in the WTO sectors is more directly provided for in the second paragraph of Article 23. From the ordinary meaning of the terms used in the chapeau of Article 23.2 (‘in such cases, Members shall’), it is also clear that the second paragraph of Article 23 is ‘explicitly linked to, and has to be read together with and subject to, Article 23.1’. That is to say, the specific prohibitions of paragraph 2 of Article 23 have to be understood in the context of the first paragraph, i.e. when such action is performed by a WTO Member with a view to redressing a WTO violation.
We also agree with the US - Section 301 Panel Report that Article 23.2 contains ‘egregious examples of conduct that contradict the rules of the DSU’ and which constitute more specific forms of unilateral actions, otherwise generally prohibited by Article 23.1 of the DSU.
‘[t]hese rules and procedures [Article 23.1] clearly cover much more than the ones specifically mentioned in Article 23.2. There is a great deal more State conduct which can violate the general obligation in Article 23.1 to have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures of the DSU than the instances especially singled out in Article 23.2.’
The same Panel identified a few examples of such instances where the DSU could be violated contrary to the provisions of Article 23. Each time a Member seeking the redress of a WTO violation is not abiding by a rule of the DSU, it thus violates Article 23.1 of the DSU.
In order to verify whether individual provisions of Article 23.2 have been infringed (keeping in mind that the obligation to also observe other DSU provisions can be brought under the umbrella of Article 23.1), we must first determine whether the measure at issue comes under the coverage of Article 23.1. In other words, we need to determine whether Article 23 is applicable to the dispute before addressing the specific violations envisaged in the second paragraph of Article 23 of the DSU or elsewhere in the DSU.
Article 23.1 of the DSU provides that the criterion for determining whether Article 23 is applicable is whether the Member that imposed the measure was ‘seeking the redress of’ a WTO violation. …
The term ‘seeking’ or ‘to seek’ is defined in the Webster New Encyclopedic Dictionary as: ‘to resort to, … to make an attempt, try’. This term would therefore cover situations where an effort is made to redress WTO violations (whether perceived or WTO determined violations). The term ‘to redress’ is defined in the New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary as ‘repair (an action); atone for (a misdeed); remedy or remove; to set right or rectify (injury, a wrong, a grievance etc.); obtaining reparation or compensation’. The term ‘redress’ is defined in the New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary as: ‘reparation of or compensation for a wrong or consequent loss; remedy for or relief from some trouble; correction or reformation of something wrong’. The term 'redress' implies, therefore, a reaction by a Member against another Member, because of a perceived (or WTO determined) WTO violation, with a view to remedying the situation.
Article 23.1 of the DSU prescribes that when a WTO Member wants to take any remedial action in response to what it views as a WTO violation, it is obligated to have recourse to and abide by the DSU rules and procedures. In case of a grievance on a WTO matter, the WTO dispute settlement mechanism is the only means available to WTO Members to obtain relief, and only the remedial actions envisaged in the WTO system can be used by WTO Members. The remedial actions relate to restoring the balance of rights and obligations which form the basis of the WTO Agreement, and include the removal of the inconsistent measure, the possibility of (temporary) compensation and, in last resort, the (temporary) suspension of concessions or other obligations authorised by the DSB (Articles 3.7 and 22.1 of the DSU). The latter remedy is essentially retaliatory in nature.”
【NOTE】:
1. See, in detail, WT/DS152/R/7.38-7.46.
2. See, in detail, WT/DS165/R/6.13-6.23.
List of References
1 Sources of Legal Texts: http://www.wto.org; WTO Secretariat: The WTO Dispute Settlement Procedures (Second Edition), CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2001.
关于进一步加快我省旅游业发展的决议
河南省人大常委会
关于进一步加快我省旅游业发展的决议
河南省人民代表大会常务委员会关于进一步加快我省旅游业(2005年5月26日河南省第十届人民代表大会常务委员会第十六次会议通过)
发展的决议
河南省第十届人大常委会第十六次会议听取并审议了河南省人民政府《关于河南旅游业发展情况的报告》，对近几年来我省旅游业发展所取得的成绩给予了充分肯定。会议指出，我省是旅游资源大省，发展条件优越，市场前景广阔，但目前旅游业的发展现状与我省旅游资源大省的地位和国民经济发展的要求还不相适应。会议要求，我省旅游业的发展要以邓小平理论和“三个代表”重要思想为指导，坚持以人为本，全面落实科学发展观，抓住机遇，深化改革，尽快把旅游业培育成支柱产业，努力实现我省由旅游资源大省向旅游经济强省的跨越，为全面建设小康社会、奋力实现中原崛起
和构建社会主义和谐社会
做出更大的贡献。
一、转变观念，进一步提高对旅游业地位的认识。旅游业作为国民经济发展的重要组成部分，是关联度高、带动性强的综合性经济产业，对一个地区的经济社会发展和对外开放起着非常重要的促进作用。加快旅游业发展有利于促进经济社会协调发展，有利于实现人与自然和谐共处，有利于加快产业结构调整。各级政府要充分认识新形势下发展旅游业的重大意义，切实加强领导，结合本地旅游资源优势和特色，采取得力措施，加大投入力度，加强旅游基础设施建设，完善配套设施，促进旅游业健康快速发展。
二、深化改革，加强管理，加快旅游业发展步伐。旅游业的持续健康发展，要建立科学合理、运转高效、协调有力的旅游管理体制。目前，旅游管理体制和旅游企业经营机制方面存在的问题，是制约我省旅游业进一步发展的重要因素。各级政府要根据本地实际情况，深化改革，加强协调，进一步加大旅游行业管理力度，调动方方面面的积极性，形成合力，
确保旅游业快速发展。要积极支持引导旅游景区（点）、旅游企业实施产权制度和经营机制改革，引进先进管理模式和经营理念，创新思路、搞活经营。要积极拓宽融资渠道，鼓励引导各种社会资金的投入，积极推进旅游业发展。要加强行业协会建设，搞好行业自律。
三、整合资源，努力提高我省旅游业的综合竞争力。各级政府要认真贯彻落实科学发展观，加快制定本地旅游发展规划。按照旅游资源开发与生态环境保护、
文化遗产保护
相结合的原则，科学规划，合理开发，严格保护，保障旅游业的可持续发展。各地要充分利用各自优势，大力发展文化旅游、山水生态旅游、红色旅游等特色旅游。要建立灵活的价格机制，不断拓展旅游市场。要加强区域合作，打破地域界限，努力营造我省开放型的旅游大市场。要提升传统精品景区（点）的品位，增强精品旅游线路的辐射带动作用，积极培育新的旅游精品，着力打造世界知名旅游品牌。要积极研制特色旅游商品，开发特色文化娱乐节目，根据需要建设旅游商品市场和娱乐场所，满足旅游购物和娱乐需要，拉长旅游产业化链条，提高旅游产业化水平。要鼓励引导我省旅游企业与国内外知名企业联手，优化组合，培育大型旅游骨干企业和企业集团，促进旅游企业的规模化、集约化经营。要积极采取多种形式，充分利用现代化传媒手段，加大宣传促销力度，全面宣传河南旅游，提升河南旅游的知名度，增强河南旅游在国内外的影响力。
四、优化环境，依法保障旅游业的健康发展。各级政府要认真贯彻执行国家有关法律法规和《河南省旅游管理条例》，省政府及有关部门要制定完善配套规章制度和行业管理办法，依法行政。各级人大要加强对旅游法律法规贯彻执行情况的监督，支持旅游业的发展。各旅游景区（点）和旅游企业要进一步增强法治意识和诚信观念，合法经营。
工商、公安、旅游、质监等部门要加强旅游市场监管力度，依法打击无证经营、强买强卖、价格欺诈等违法行为，全面规范旅游市场，大力优化旅游环境，切实维护广大旅游者的合法权益。各级政府要高度重视并切实做好旅游安全工作。要认真做好旅游管理服务的人才培养和技术培训工作，全面提高旅游管理水平和服务质量，促进我省旅游业的持续健康快速发展。
河南省人民代表大会常务委员会
公告第五十三号
《河南省历史文化名城保护条例》已经河南省第十届人民代表大会常务委员会第十八次会议于2005年7月30日审议通过，现予公布，自2005年10月1日起施行。
河南省人民代表大会常务委员会
二○○五年七月三十日
河南省历史文化名城保护条例
(2005年7月30日河南省第十届人民代表大会
常务委员会第十八次会议通过)
第一条为了加强历史文化名城的保护，根据《中华人民共和国文物保护法》、《中华人民共和国城市规划法》等有关法律、法规，结合本省实际，制定本条例。
第二条本条例适用于本省行政区域内历史文化名城的保护、规划、建设、管理。
第三条本条例所称历史文化名城，是指由国务院核定公布的保存文物特别丰富并且具有重大历史价值或者革命纪念意义的城市。
第四条各级人民政府负责保护本行政区域内的历史文化名城，并把保护工作纳入国民经济和社会发展计划，将保护经费列入财政预算。
鼓励和支持社会各界以捐赠、资助等方式参与历史文化名城的保护工作。
第五条历史文化名城的保护应当坚持科学规划、突出重点、有效保护、合理利用、加强管理的原则，正确处理保护与建设的关系。
第六条历史文化名城所在地的人民政府及其有关部门应当利用历史遗存和革命遗迹进行爱国主义和革命传统教育，增强公民爱护历史文化名城、保护人文与自然资源的意识，提高城市的文明程度。
第七条历史文化名城所在地的城市规划行政主管部门和文物行政主管部门依据各自职责，负责历史文化名城的规划、保护、管理和监督工作。
发展和改革、财政、旅游、交通、环保、公安、消防等有关部门应当依据各自的职责，共同做好历史文化名城的保护工作。
第八条任何单位和个人都有保护历史文化名城的义务，有权劝阻、制止、检举破坏历史文化名城的行为。
各级人民政府和有关部门对在历史文化名城保护工作中做出突出贡献的单位和个人给予表彰或者奖励。
第九条历史文化名城所在地的人民政府应当及时组织编制历史文化名城保护规划，经同级人民代表大会或者其常务委员会审查同意后，按照批准程序报批。
第十条历史文化名城保护规划应当包括：保护的总体目标、保护内容、保护范围、保护标准、保护规划的实施保障措施等。
第十一条编制历史文化名城保护规划应当符合以下要求：
(一)保持和延续历史文化名城的格局、风貌特征，保护文物古迹，继承传统文化；
(二)根据历史文化遗存的性质、形态、分布和空间环境等特点，确定保护原则和工作重点，保护和利用人文资源；
(三)对于具有传统风貌的商业区、手工业区、民居以及其他古迹区整体规划保护；
(四)保护重要革命遗址，弘扬革命传统；
(五)历史文化名城保护与经济、社会发展和人文、生态环境相协调。
第十二条编制历史文化名城保护规划，应当进行科学论证，并广泛征求有关部门、专家学者和社会公众的意见。
第十三条对历史文化名城保护规划中确定的重点保护区、传统风貌协调区、重点保护建筑物，应当由城市规划行政主管部门会同文物行政主管部门编制出详细规划，合理确定规划的主要控制指标，并由城市规划行政主管部门设立标志，标明保护范围。
历史文化名城重点保护区和传统风貌协调区的详细规划，由省城市规划行政主管部门征得省文物行政主管部门同意后审批。
第十四条历史文化名城所在地的人民政府可以根据当地实际情况，对保护规划进行适当调整，并按原批准程序报批。属重大调整的，报批前须经同级人民代表大会或者其常务委员会审查同意。
第十五条经批准的历史文化名城保护规划、重点保护区和传统风貌协调区的详细规划，所在地的人民政府应当及时予以公布。
第十六条历史文化名城城市规划区内的土地利用和各项建设必须符合历史文化名城保护规划。
第十七条未经省城市规划行政主管部门和省文物行政主管部门依法审查同意，历史文化名城所在地不得擅自拓宽保护规划范围内的道路或者进行旧城改造，不得在重点保护区和传统风貌协调区内安排建设项目。
第十八条历史文化名城的新区建设和旧城改造，应当符合保护规划要求，不得破坏历史文化名城的传统风貌和格局。
第十九条历史文化名城保护规划确定保护的建筑物、构筑物，确需整修的，应当原样整修，文物行政主管部门应当加强指导和监督。在传统风貌协调区内进行的建设项目，其布局、性质、高度、体量、造型、色彩和建筑密度等，必须与名城景观、风貌相协调。其规划或者设计方案应当报省城市规划行政主管部门和省文物行政主管部门依法审查同意。
第二十条任何单位和个人不得有下列损害历史文化名城的行为：
(一)损坏或者拆毁保护规划确定保护的建筑物、构筑物及其他设施；
(二)进行危及文物古迹、革命遗址安全的建设或者爆破、挖砂、取土等活动；
(三)改变地形地貌，对历史文化名城保护构成危害；
(四)擅自占用或者破坏保护规划确定保留的绿地、河流水系、道路等；
(五)在历史文化名城重点保护区内违章搭建各种建筑物、构筑物；
(六)其他对历史文化名城保护构成破坏的活动。
第二十一条历史文化名城所在地的城市规划行政主管部门和文物行政主管部门应当依法建立健全档案制度，收集、整理、保管有关城市变迁、历史沿革等资料。
第二十二条对历史文化名城的环境造成严重污染、危及文物安全或者破坏历史文化名城风貌和景观的单位，当地人民政府应当依法责令其限期治理、关闭或者搬迁。
第二十三条历史文化名城所在地的城市规划行政主管部门应当会同文物行政主管部门对历史文化名城保护工作进行监督检查，及时纠正和处理违反本条例的行为；对严重违反保护规划的情况，应当向同级人民政府和上级主管部门报告。
第二十四条历史文化名城所在地的人民政府应当定期将历史文化名城保护工作情况向同级人民代表大会常务委员会报告并接受监督。
第二十五条违反本条例规定，城市规划、文物保护及其他有关法律、法规有行政处罚规定的，从其规定。
第二十六条违反本条例规定，历史文化名城所在地的人民政府或者其有关部门擅自改变或者不执行历史文化名城保护规划，造成重大损失或者严重后果的，对主管人员和直接责任人员依法给予行政处分；构成犯罪的，依法追究刑事责任。
第二十七条有本条例第二十条第(一)项规定行为、不涉及文物的，由城市规划行政主管部门责令其停止损害，限期改正，并可处一万元以上五万元以下的罚款。造成损失的，应当赔偿损失。
有本条例第二十条第(二)项规定行为的，由文物行政主管部门责令其停止违法行为，限期采取补救措施，并依法处罚。
有本条例第二十条第(三)项规定行为的，由城市规划行政主管部门责令其停止违法行为，限期采取补救措施，并可处五千元以上二万元以下的罚款。
有本条例第二十条第(四)、(五)、(六)项规定行为的，由城市规划行政主管部门或者有关行政主管部门责令其停止违法行为，限期改正，并依法处罚。
第二十八条城市规划、文物行政主管部门及其他有关部门的工作人员在历史文化名城的保护工作中有下列行为之一的，由其所在单位或上级主管部门责令改正或者给予行政处分；构成犯罪的，依法追究刑事责任：
(一)不按规定进行保护规划的编制、申报、审查的；
(二)不按保护规划组织实施保护，致使历史实物遗存、传统风貌遭受破坏的；
(三)有其他滥用职权、玩忽职守和徇私舞弊行为的。
第二十九条本条例施行前省人民政府批准公布的省级历史文化名城的保护工作，参照本条例执行。
第三十条本条例自2005年10月1日起施行。
河南省人民代表大会常务委员会
